In early 1954, the French army camped at Dien Bien Phu, a fortified base at the bottom of a valley and close to communications on the Laotian border. By mid-March, it was clear that the French were to fight under a capture of Viet Minh and that only external intervention in the form of new troops or airstrikes could save them. Although President Eisenhower was determined to prevent a communist victory in Vietnam, the U.S. Congress and government officials were equally determined not to intervene unless they could do so as part of a larger coalition. Britain and other NATO members have refused to help rescue a cause they consider lost. Dien Bien Phu fell in May and the French withdrew from Vietnam. Like Exactly Chou and Molotov with Ho-Chi minh-by threat, conviction or a combination of two will probably never be known; but it seems reasonable to think that, given the precarious political situation in southern Vietnam, the multitude of armed sects and other groups hostile to the Saigon government, the ever-aggravated presence of the French and the economic and social vulnerabilities of a war-torn society, Beijing and Moscow could convincingly assert that South Vietnam would never come together sufficiently to provide a viable alternative to the DRV. The Communists might have expected the DRV to take control of the entire country as much as by an electoral victory in 1956. The Chinese accepted the idea that the Geneva Accords had created at least temporarily two Vietnamese governments, instead of simply dividing the country administratively. [doc.
64] But it is unlikely that they or the Soviets would expect that even an American-backed South Vietnam could survive. In other words, the possibility of a prosperous and anti-communist South Vietnam was perhaps not a serious and certainly not immediate concern for communist power. The Geneva conference had created French goodwill for Moscow and created security for Beijing; What could happen in southern Vietnam in 1954 seems irrelevant. Despite Mends-France`s desire to set a deadline and inaugurate, for the first time in the history of the French engagement in Indochina, soldiers for the service, Washington opposed a revaluation of its Geneva delegation. Equally sensitive to any proposal that might interfere with the United States under the final comparison conditions regarding Mends-France`s difficulties at the conference table, Dulles felt that the French would eventually accept an unsatisfactory settlement for the United States, whether the USDEL is revalued or not. As he explained to Dillon, the United States would be forced to dissociate itself in a way that “would be deeply irritated by the French when our attempt to block a peace they very much desire.” “with a possible “irreparable violation of Franco-American relations The least embarrassing alternative,” according to Mr. Dulles, was to avoid the likelihood of a “spectacular dissociation” by departing completely from the conference. [doc. 65] The Geneva conference lasted until 21 July before signing a formal agreement.